The physics of large-scale food crises by Richmond, Peter et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
7.
05
10
0v
1 
 [p
hy
sic
s.b
io-
ph
]  
13
 Ju
l 2
01
8
The physics of large-scale food crises
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Abstract
Investigating the “physics” of food crises consists in identifying features which are
common to all large-scale food crises. One element which stands out is the fact that
during a food crisis there is not only a surge in deaths but also a correlative tempo-
rary decline in conceptions and subsequent births. As a matter of fact, birth reduction
may even start several months before the death surge and can therefore serve as an
early warning signal of an impending crisis.
This scenario is studied in three cases of large-scale food crises. Finland (1868),
India (1867–1907), China (1960–1961). It turns out that between the regional am-
plitudes of death spikes and birth troughs there is a power law relationship. This
confirms what was already observed for the epidemic of 1918 in the United States
(Richmond et al. 2018b).
In a second part of the paper we explain how this relationship can be used for the
investigation of mass-mortality episodes in cases where direct death data are either
uncertain or nonexistent.
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2Introduction
A plea for comparative analysis
The title of the present paper1 was inspired by a book published seven years ago
(Viswanathan et al. 2011) under the title: “The physics of foraging”. From foraging,
i.e. the collection of food by animals, to food crises there is of course a smooth tran-
sition. However, in this title it is the mention of the word “physics” which was for
us the most important source of inspiration for it means that the purpose of the book
was to examine basic features of foraging that are shared by many species. To find
common mechanisms in seemingly different phenomena has been a permanent ob-
jective of physics throughout its development over past centuries. Is there a common
factor in the fall of apples, rain drops, meteorites and the “fall” of the Moon toward
the Earth? We now know that the common factor is the gravitational attraction. Here,
we will be guided by a similar agenda.
It can be obsereved that such a comparative approach was quite common in the late
19th century; see for instance the works of Louis-Alphonse Bertillon (1872), Alfred
Espinas (1878), Jacques Bertillon (1892), Emile Durkheim (1895). One may deplore
that in recent decades comparative studies of this kind (among which we do not
include meta-analyses which is something different) have become rare.
The Bertillon effect: from heat-wave mortality to large-scale food crises
Here we will focus on the Bertillon effect (Bertillon 1892, Richmond et al. 2018a,b)
which consists in the fact that any mass mortality is followed 9 months later by a
birth rate trough2.
Our previous parallel with gravitation becomes particularly relevant here for indeed,
just like gravity, the Bertillon effect has a broad range of applicability. There is a long
chain of cases which goes from heat-waves, to epidemics, to earthquakes, to large-
scale food crises. As in any chain, it is of particular interest to consider more closely
its two extremities. Heat-waves in developed countries result in excess mortality3 of
the order of 24% (Rey et al. 2007, p. 536, Table 1) whereas in the food crises that
we are going to study mortality rates were increased by up to 140%. The successful
identification of birth rate troughs in the wake of heat-waves required a skillful and
1The paper was written by three physicists. However, we feel that our approach is very much in the
spirit of the methodological guidelines defined by the French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1898). Inciden-
tally, the same comparative approach was also used in our previously published papers in biodemography
(http://www.lpthe.jussieu.fr/∼roehner/biodemo.html.)
2Note that the birth rate trough is much larger (usually about 10 times larger) than the reduction in births due to the
fatalities. This was shown in detail in Richmond et al. (2018a) and can also be seen from the simple fact that excess
fatalities would result in a one sided Heaviside fall not in a symmetrical and fairly narrow trough. This trough is mostly
due to a temporary reduction in the conception rate among the survivors.
3In the sense of: [(observed deaths)-(deaths in normal years)]/(deaths in normal years).
3pioneering analysis of daily birth data by Arnaud Re´gnier-Loilier (2010 a,b). The
reason why heat waves display only a faint Bertillon effect is not only due to low
excess mortality but also to it being concentrated in elderly people which makes it
irrelevant for birth rates4.
Why did we say that heat-wave cases constitute the beginning of the chain? One
could of course consider diseases (e.g. the Lyme disease) which have even lower
mortality. However, as the birth rate troughs of heat-waves are already at the limit of
what can be observed, the Bertillon effect for Lyme disease would be inobservable.
It would be like a pulsar which is known to exist but is too far away to be seen with
an optical telescope.
In the cases considered in the present study the Bertillon effect is so massive that it
can be identified (and studied even at regional level) with annual vital statistics.
From well documented cases to uncertain situations
Why did we choose to focus on the three cases selected? The main reason is that
these cases are massive and statistically fairly well documented.
In contrast, there are many cases of mass mortality for which there is considerable
uncertainty. Thanks to the death-birth relationship (to be stated below) one is in good
position to throw new light on such episodes. How?
Most countries, even those which do not have a reliable statistical registration infras-
tructure, conduct censuses. Because this is done periodically (e.g. once in a decade)
it does not require a permanent organization. As will be shown below, the distribu-
tion of the population by age measured in a census gives a fairly accurate picture
of birth rate changes in the years preceding the census. For instance, the census of
1982 in China gives a good picture of the birth rate squeeze that occurred in sev-
eral provinces in 1961. Then, through the relationship between birth troughs and
death spikes one can get an estimate of the mortality. Even though not perfect, such
estimates give at least a rough picture of what happened.
Outline
Our investigation will proceed through the following steps.
(1) First, we present the three famine cases which will be studied. Apart from
giving some social and historical background information, we will discuss the origin,
reliability and accuracy of the birth and death data.
(2) Then, in each case we describe the Bertillon death-birth connection.
(3) In order to get a comparative view we bring together the three Bertillon rela-
tionships and we compare them with the results already obtained in Richmond et al.
4Even for persons in age of having children the birth rate trough is only marginally due to those who die. Most of the
effect comes from the much larger number of persons who are affected but do not die.
4(2018b).
(4) We show how to retrieve past annual birth rates from a population pyramid.
(5) Finally, in our conclusion, we develop two examples in which mortality rates
are derived from census data.
PART 1: QUANTIFICATION OF THE BERTILLON EFFECT
Background information for the crises
Causes of death
First of all, we should explain why we prefer to use the expression “food crises”
rather than “famines”. The word “famine” elicits images of people starving to death.
Although, this may of course exist as documented by impressive Internet pictures of
children almost reduced to their bones5, death by starvation represents only a small
fraction of the global death toll of food crises. This can be illustrated by data from
Finish and Indian sources.
• The data given in Finland 1 (p. XXXIV) and Finland 2 (p. 421-422) tell us that
during the crisis of 1868 death by starvation represented only 1.71% of the deaths.
Themain cause of death was typhus (43%), followed by tuberculosis (5.84%), dysen-
tery (5.70%) and smallpox (3.02%).
• Data for the food crisis of 1942–1944 in India are given in Maharatna (1992, p.
331). Death by starvation represented 2.1% of the deaths. The main cause of death
was fever due to diseases (mainly malaria) which accounted for 34.8% followed by
scabies (18.4%) and dysentery (10.9%).
In short, at symptoms level, food scarcity crises have a close resemblance with epi-
demics.
Crisis of 1868 in Finland
Immediate causes such as a rainy and cold summers in 1866 and 1867 can be men-
tioned but in order to get a real understanding the crisis of 1868 should not be seen
as an isolated event. In fact, there had been similar crises in 1833 and 1856. albeit
of smaller magnitude (Flora et al. 1987, p, 24,51). Whereas in the 1840s the average
annual death rate was around 25 0/00 it reached 46 0/00 in 1833, 34 0/00 in 1856 and 78
0/00 in 1868.
The main factor in this succession of crises was certainly the rapid growth of the
population. Between 1811 and 1865 it increased by 66% which is twice the 30%
5For instance the persons shown on the cover of Davis (2000). Needless to say, the inclusion of pictures which have
such an emotional content also reveal something about the agenda of the author.
5increase in France in the same time interval (Flora et al. 1987, p. 55-56). This 66%
increase represented an average annual increase of 1.20% (against 0.55% in France).
Certainly agricultural production did not increase at the same rate which means that
any bad harvest due to adverse weather conditions would result in malnutrition or a
more serious crisis. The annual death rate of 78 0/00 reached in 1868 in Finland was
one of the highest ever observed anywhere.
The severity of a food scarcity is best judged by the death rate peak for this is a
fairly intrinsic metric. In contrast excess-deaths are very dependent on the level of
the baseline death rate chosen to define normal conditions.
It is true that at the level of Indian provinces the death rate reached similar values:
for instance in 1900 it reached 88 in the “Central Provinces”. However, if nationwide
data were available they would certainly show lower peak values for in such a large
land as India the crises were not completely synchronous.
Food crises in India
Between 1860 and 1910 there were recurrent food crises in India but most of them
were limited to some parts of the country. A brief description can be found in
Roehner (1995, p.5-6).
Can one explain the famines in India in the same way as the famines in Finland that
is to say by a rapid increase of the population. The answer is no. Assuming that the
population estimate given for 1820, namely 209 millions is indeed reliable, one finds
for the period 1820–1865 an average annual increase rate of only 0.27%.
However, if the population stagnated the amount of food available in India may have
decreased. One can mention three reasons for a shrinking food supply (Davis 2000,
p. 59-66).
• Between 1875 and 1900 Indian annual grain exports to Great Britain increased
from 3 to 10 million tons, equivalent to the annual nutrition of 25 million people.
Davis does not give trade data for the period before 1875. However, it is known
that as a result of the repeal of the corn tariff around 1850 Britain’s dependence on
imported grain increased from 2% in the the 1830s, to 24% in the 1860s, and 65%
(for wheat) in the 1880s. Thus, it is quite possible that the drain on Indian grain
started before 1875.
• In Berar (central India) the acreage of cotton doubled between 1875 and 1900.
• Although a colony, with regard to its budget India was treated like an indepen-
dent country. This meant reimbursing the stockholders of the “East India Company”,
paying the costs of the 1857 revolt, supporting an army of about 100,000 that was
employed not only in India but also in foreign war theaters (e.g. Afghanistan, Tibet,
Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan). Military expenditures alone represented about one third of
6the budget. As a result, little funds were available for agricultural improvement.
Having said that, in India just as in Finland and in China, the immediate causes of the
crises were unfavorable weather conditions, particularly drought which in Madras
and Bombay provinces resulted from a reduced monsoon rain season.
Food crisis in China, 1960–1961
The explanation given for Finland also applies to China and in fact to even greater
degree. From 1949 to 1959 the Chinese population increased from 541 to 672 mil-
lions, an increase of 24.2% which represented an average annual increase of 2.20%.
This is 4 times faster than the French rate of 0.55% that we took as a yardstick in
discussing the case of Finland. It is true that between 1953 and 1957 population and
foodgrain production increased at the same rate of 2.0% annually: the population
from 588 to 646 millions and the foodgrain production from 168 to 185 million tons.
However, after a bumper crop of 212 million tons in 1958 it declined due to bad
weather conditions to the point of being reduced in 1960 to its level of 1957 at which
time there had been about 50 million fewer Chinese to feed (SNIE 1961, p.3).
At the same time the death rate fell from 20 0/00 to about 10 0/00. It is the fall in
the death rate which brought about the rapid population increase for the birth rate
remained stable at around 40 0/00. Fig. 1 shows that even at its peak value in 1960 the
death rate reaches only 25 0/00 (Ren kou 1988, p. 268) which is lower than the death
rate in Bengal under normal conditions and only slightly higher than the death rate
in 1949. In short, instead of people starving to death, one should rather think of the
situation as similar to the one of 19496. It is true that the situation may have been
more tragic in some specific provinces as for instance Anhui or Sichuan. However,
this was not really new for, as we will see below, the best predictor for regional death
rates in 1960 was the situation one decade earlier.
Comparative graph
Fig. 1 shows the changes in death rates in India and China. For the sake of clarity we
did not represent the curve for Finland on the same graph; however, it can be noted
that the baseline death rate before the Great Famine of 1868 was around 28 0/00 and
that the death rate peak reached 78 0/00. In a general way, for a given peak value, the
lower the baseline rate, the higher the excess mortality with respect to this baseline.
The fact that for China the baseline level was 2 or 3 times lower than in India is the
main reason for a substantially higher excess death number.
In Fig. 1 it may appear surprising that in 1931–1940 the death rate in Bengal was
about 1.5 times higher than the rate for 1874–875 in Madras. The most likely ex-
6According to the SNIE (1961. p.1) report discussed in Appendix A: “Widespread famine does not appear to be at
hand but in some provinces people are now on a bare subsistence diet.”
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Fig. 1 Comparison of famines in India and China. The vertical scale is the same for the 3 curves. As there
are no nationwide data for India the curve corresponds to data for the province of Madras in the south east of
India. Sources: Maharatna (1992, p.55), Ren kou (1988, p.278).
planation is under-reporting. The registration of deaths started around 1870 and, as
is often observed, the scope and completeness of the registration increased progres-
sively in the course of following decades. In the 1940s, the corrective factors used
by various authors still ranged from 1.32 to 1.70 (Maharatma p. 228). This suggests
that in the 1870s under-reporting may have been more serious, may be by a factor 2.
The Bertillon death-birth relationship
In each of the previous cases death and birth data are available not only at national
level but also at provincial level. This will allow us to carry out a regression analysis
in the same spirit as in Richmond et al. (2018b). Here, however we will have to work
with yearly (not monthly) data. It is to maintain accuracy that we limited ourselves to
massive events. As in many countries only annual data are available, it is important to
8see whether or not in such cases the Bertillon effect can be analyzed in a meaningful
way.
Bertillon effect in Finland: food crisis of 1868
Fig. 2 shows the Bertillon effect for the 8 provinces which composed Finland in the
1860s.
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Fig. 2 Finland, 1868: relationship between the amplitudes of death spikes and birth troughs. As the
graph is a log-log plot it means that: Ab = CA
α
d
. where α = 0.50 ± 0.26 and C = 0.89 ± 0.06 (the error bars
are for a confidence level of 0.95); the coefficient of linear correlation is 0.83. Each number corresponds to one
of the 8 governments (i.e. provinces) which composed Finland. Their names are as follows: 1=Uudenmaan (S),
2=Turun ja Porin (SW), 3=Ha¨meenlinnan (S),4=Wiipurin (SE), 5=Mikkelin (SE), 6=Kuopion (E), 7=Waasan
(SW), 8=Oulun (N). Sources: Finland (1871, p.34,XII), Finland (1902, p.274,397)
Asmonthly data are available for the whole country, we know that the death rate peak
occurred in May 1868; therefore, as expected, the center of the birth trough will be
in December 1868–January 1869. In other words the birth trough will be split in two
parts, one part in late 1868 and the other in early 1869. However, because of the
rebound effect7 the annual birth number for 1869 is higher than the one for 1868.
That is why in Fig. 2 the vertical scale displays births of 1868 and not 1869.
Birth troughs seen as a sensitive detector of population suffering
At first sight it might seem that the absence of a death spike, i.e. Ad = 1 means that
7The rebound effect occurs in the months immediately following the trough; it is a compensating rise of the birth rate
above normal baseline level (see Maharatna 1992, p. 380 and Richmond et al. 2018a). In other words it is a return to
equilibrium marked by an “overshooting” episode.
9the situation is normal and should therefore be associated with Ab = 1. However,
the fact that there are no excess-deaths does not mean that the population does not
suffer. A simple illustration is a non fatal disease which nevertheless makes people
ill. The 2003 SARS epidemic in Hong Kong discussed in Richmond et al. (2018a)
was a situation of this kind. Although not strictly equal to zero, the death toll was
only 40 per million. Nevertheless, the threat and disorganization due to the epidemic
produced an excess birth trough of 6% (Ab = 1.06).
In the same line of thought it will be seen in subsequent cases that usually the birth
rate starts to fall in an early stage at a moment when no increase of the death rate can
be detected. In other words, birth troughs are a detector of population suffering that
is more sensitive than Ad.
Bertillon effect in India: time series of food crisis
Here “India” refers to the British colony before its division into Bangladesh, India
and Pakistan.
As already observed there are no nation-wide data for India in spite of the fact that
some food crises extended to several parts of the country. Instead one has data sep-
arately for several provinces: Bombay, Central Provinces, Madras, Punjab, United
Provinces. Fig.3a,b displays the basic mechanism of food crises: as the death toll
increases the birth rate decreases. One may wonder why here, in contrast to Finland,
the birth trough occurs in the year following the death spike. Monthly data that are
available in some cases (Dyson 1991a,b, 1993 and Maharatna 1992, p. 235) show
that usually the maximum of the deaths occurred in August at the beginning of the
wet season. The reason for that comes from the fact that the main cause of mortality
is malaria whose spread is favored by humidity.
With deaths spiking in August instead of May as was the case in Finland the effects
of reduced conception will be mostly visible in the following year.
Fig. 3a and 3b show that the analysis performed in Richmond et al. (2018a) on
monthly data can be repeated in a similar way with annual data.
Bertillon effect in India: global death-birth relationship
Next, we wish to discover the relationship existing between the amplitudes of death
spikes and birth troughs of different crises. This is summarized in Fig. 4. There is
again a power-law relationship.
Bertillon effect in China: time series of the food crisis of 1960-1961
Of the three countries considered in this paper it is for the case of China that we have
the most complete data set. Annual data are given for over 20 provinces from 1955
to 1985. In what follows we will focus on a 10-year interval centered on the crisis of
1960-1961.
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Fig. 4 India (1877-1908). Relationship between the amplitudes of death spikes and birth troughs. The re-
lationship is as follows: Ab = CA
α
d
. where α = 0.30±0.16 and C = 1.01±0.06. The coefficient of linear cor-
relation is: 0.81. The correspondence between the numbers and the provinces is as follows: 1=Madras (1877),
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(1908), 7=Bombay (1897), 8=Central Provinces (1897), 9=Berar (1897). Source: Maharatna (1992, p.55).
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Fig. 4 shows typical graphs for 4 different provinces . In a general way, the crisis
was more serious in South China than in North China and in the south the severity
increased from east to west. Apart from Beijing, the three other selected provinces
are all located at the same latitude (about 500 km south of Shanghai): Fujian is on
the Pacific coast, Hunan in central China and Sichuan about 700km to the west of
Hunan. The graphs show very clearly two characteristics of the Bertillon effect.
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Fig. 5 Birth and death rates in 4 Chinese provinces. The curve of deaths is in black with filled squares; the
curve of birth is in red with filled circles. The graphs are ranked by order of increasing severity. It can be seen
that the fall of the birth rates in 1957, 1958 provide so to say early warnings of an impeding crisis. The fact that
the minima of the birth troughs occur in 1861 shows that the mortality rates certainly peaked in the second half
of 1960. Source: Ren kou (1988)
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• The one year time lag between death peaks and birth troughs
• The birth rate rebounds in the two or three years following the troughs.
In the next subsection, in order to find out the relationship between the amplitudes
of death peaks and birth troughs, we extend this analysis to 22 provinces
Bertillon effect in China: global death-birth relationship
Fig. 6 shows the relationship between death peaks and birth troughs. As in Finland
and India it can be described by a power law. The exponent is about the same as in
Finland.
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Source: Ren kou (1988)
Structural fragility
One may wonder what made the crisis more serious in some provinces than in others.
We have already mentioned that globally the north was less affected than the south
and the east less than the west. However, besides these fairly loose observations there
13
is another which is both simpler and more revealing. It consists in the fact that the
provinces which have the highest death rate peaks in 1960 are those which already
had the highest death rate in the normal years before the crisis. This is illustrated
graphically in Fig. 7.
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Fig. 7 Relationship between the death rates in 1956 and in 1960 (food crisis). The coefficient of linear
correlation is: 0.81. The labels are the same as in Fig.5. Source: Ren kou (1988)
Is there a similar connection between normal and peak death rates in Finland and in
India? It is impossible to say because in those cases the number of separate provinces
for which data are available is too small.
What interpretation can one give of the effect shown in Fig. 6? The higher death
rates in normal times suggest structural fragility factors. To get better insight it is
useful to compare extreme cases. On one end we consider the northern provinces
of Heilongjiang and Jilin where the crisis was subdued while on the other end we
consider Anhui and Sichuan where it was very severe.
In Table 1 we computed the population growth between 1954 and 1959. A much
faster growth in Anhui-Sichuan would suggest that, as was indeed the case for the
whole country, the increase of food supply could not match the population growth.
However, the data in Table 1 do not show a faster population increase in Anhui-
14
Sichuan. As a matter of fact, had it existed such a faster growth would not explain
that the death rate in Anhui-Sichuan was already higher in 1956. This fact rather
suggests that there was a structural fragility that was already present in 1956 but had
an aggravated effect in 1960.
Table 1: Regional fragility
Population Population Percent Population Death Death
increase density rate rate
1954 1959 1954 1954 1960
(106) (106) (per sq-km) (per 1,000) (per 1,000)
Jilin 11.7 13.2 13% 60 10.3 10.1
Heilongjiang 12.7 16.9 33% 37 10.5 10.5
Anhui 31.7 34.4 8.5% 224 16.4 50.2
Sichuan 64.4 73.7 14% 134 15.4 47.8
Notes: Jilin and Heilongjiang were little affected by the crisis whereas Anhui and Sichuan were the two
provinces where the crisis was the most severe. It seems that population density is the main factor which
can explain this difference; in Anhui-Sichuan it was on average 3.7 times larger than in Jilin-Heilongjiang.
This created a permanent fragility and sensitivity to weather conditions which is revealed by the high death
rates even before the crisis.
Source: Ren kou (1988)
The data in Table 1 show that the population density was far higher in Anhui-Sichuan
than in Jilin-Heilongjiang. The difference is all the more striking because in contrast
to Jilin-Heilongjiang Sichuan had at that time almost no industry.
Another contributing factor was the regional prevalence differential of infectious dis-
eases. It is well known that malnutrition reduces the ability of the organism to fight
infection. For tuberculosis in 1990 the prevalence was 147 per 100,000 in the East,
198 in the Center and 216 in the west (China Tuberculosis Control Collaboration
2004, p.421)
We will not develop this analysis further for it would lead us too far away from the
main purpose of our paper which to focus on general rules. In the next subsection
we compare the regression lines in Finland, India and China.
Comparison of the regression parameters
When the three regression lines are drawn on the same graph one can compare their
slopes (given by the exponent α) and their levels (given by the coefficient C). The
level is given by the birth trough amplitude for a given death peak amplitude. One
should realize that this depend very much upon how the birth deficit is divided be-
tween the two years. Thus, for a death peak in May (as in Finland) the birth deficit
will be divided almost equally between 1868 and 1869. On the contrary, if deaths
15
had peaked in November 1868 then the whole birth deficit would occur in 1869. In
other words, to make this comparison significant one would need monthly data.
With respect to the slopes we observe that they are fairly similar for Finland and
China but 50% smaller for India. Regarding the value of α in India one can observe
that in this country the data cover several food crises in successive years whereas in
Finland and China they cover a single crisis. However, it is not clear why this should
lead to a lower α.
For the influenza epidemic of October 1918 in the United States the slope was (Rich-
mond et al. 2018b): α = 0.19 ± 0.1 and C = 1.28 ± 0.22. Here, a lower value of
α makes sense. To make the argument simpler, let us consider as an approximation
that C = 1; this means that in all cases the regression line starts from the point
(1, 1). Then the question becomes: “For a given death peak how many people will
suffer to the point of reducing conceptions?” It makes sense to observe that during a
food crisis more people do suffer, and suffer more severely, than during an influenza
epidemic. An obvious reason is that the influenza epidemic was much shorter than
any of the food-crises that we considered. It lasted only about one month, from 15
October to 15 November 1918 whereas the food crises lasted more than one year.
In the last section before the conclusion we will show how the death-birth relation-
ship can be used as an exploration tool for historical mass mortality events.
PART 2: MASS MORTALITY EPISODES EXPLORED
THROUGH THE BERTILLON EFFECT
Why are mortality statistics often uncertain?
The production of vital statistics comprises two fairly different tasks.
• In order to register individual births and deaths one needs a network extending
to hospitals and doctors of the whole country. This is a challenging task as can be
seen from the fact that in a vast country like the United States it took several decades
to extend the registration network to all states. The task was completed only around
1930. Even once established, registration networks may be overwhelmed during
mass mortality episodes.
• The second task is the organization of censuses. Although by no means an easy
task, the organization of censuses does not require a permanent network extending to
the whole country. In a time span of 3 or 4 months the same team of census officers
can move from region to region until the whole country has been covered.
The fact that the organization of a census is a much less demanding task than daily
registration is demonstrated by the observation that the first US census took place
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about one century before the national registration network was completed.
How can one derive annual birth numbers from census records?
In principle, a census does not give any information about births or deaths but it gives
the age of all people and from these data one can derive approximate birth data. This
is illustrated in Fig. 8a,b.
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Fig. 8a,b Derivation of birth data from a population pyramid. (a) The huge indentation is due to the birth
deficit in 1960-1961. The population pyramid of Anhui province was built with the data of the census of 1982.
Each step represents an age group born in a single year. Males are on the left and females on the right. The
birth rate trough corresponds to people who were 1982 − 1961 = 21 year old at the moment of the census.
People older than 21 were born before 1961 and people younger than 21 were born after 1961. In this way one
can reconstitute approximate birth data for the whole period from 1955 to 1982. (b) Graph 7b is for males; its
horizontal axis shows the years of birth as derived from the ages recorded in the census of 1982. It shows a
fairly good agreement between the real birth data and the approximate birth data derived from the population
pyramid. Sources: Population pyramid: IPUMS. Birth data: Ren kou (1988).
In what sense are the data derived from the population pyramid approximate birth
numbers? In principle the size b′(1982) of the age group 0 − 1 of the population
pyramid should be equal to the number b(1982) of births in 1982. The fact that
in graph 7b the two points are not identical is because we have been using a 1%
sample of the census of 1982. This gives an idea of the statistical fluctuations. More
generally, the individuals aged x in 1982 were born in yb = 1982− x.
For instance, the individuals born in yb = 1970will be 12 year old in 1982. Naturally,
during these 12 years some of these children died or moved from Anhui to another
place (whether in China or abroad); conversely some children may have moved into
Anhui. If these population movements are important the size of the 12-year age
group will have little to do with the number of births in 1970. On the contrary, if
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there were few population movements a comparison of the numbers b′(x) and b(x)
will tell us how well the registration system was working. Generally speaking, the
registration of births is more reliable than the registration of deaths for at least two
reasons.
• When funeral services are overwhelmed by the number of deceased people it
may happen that they are buried by relatives or neighbors without being registered,
especially in times of epidemics. On the contrary, as there are no birth rate spikes
the birth registration services will not get overwhelmed. In addition the registration
of newborns does not need to be done immediately after birth, it can be done at any
time.
• Politically, dead people are usually a more sensitive matter than newborns. The
authorities may wish to publish under-estimated death numbers8.
Preliminary test of the methodology on influenza deaths in Pennsylvania
First of all, before using it as an exploration tool, we wish to test the accuracy of
the methodology on a case in which the death toll is known. Why did we select
for our test the influenza epidemic in Pennsylvania? The impact of the disease was
particularly severe in Pennsylvania. The amplitude of the death peak of 1918 (with
respect to the average of the 1917 and 1919 numbers) was 1.56 in Pennsylvania but
only 1.35 for the whole country (or more precisely for all death registration states).
The challenge now is to see if we can derive the death peak amplitude solely from the
age-group data given by the census of 1930. For that purpose we need to go through
the following steps.
(1) First, as was already done in the previous subsection, we derive from the age-
groups given by the census of 1930 proxy birth numbers. To distinguish these proxy
birth numbers from the real birth numbers (given by the registration network) they
will be called census birth numbers. This step is done in Fig. 9a,b. In contrast with
Fig. 8a,b here there is no huge trough. Before doing the test we could not know
whether or not the small trough of 1918 would be covered by the background noise.
Fortunately, it turns out that it can be identified. Its amplitude is 1.09.
(2) The second step is to use the death-birth relationship to derive the amplitude
of the death peak. As the level of the regression line is not well defined (as was
explained eralier it depends upon the month of the death spike) we take again C = 1
for the multiplicative constant. Thus, using the value of α given previously, one gets:
Ab = A
0.19
d ⇒ Ad = A
1/0.19
b = 1.09
5.26 = 1.57
8For instance, according to “Re´sume´ re´trospectif (1907, p. 368), the death rate in Ireland in the period 1864–1870 was
16.6 0/00which was the lowest rate among all European countries. It was lower than in England and Wales (22.5), Sweden
(20.2), Denmark (19.9) or Prussia (27.0). Most likely such a small rate resulted from under-reporting.
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Fig. 9a,b Derivation of birth data from the population pyramid of Pennsylvania. (a) The population pyra-
mid was truncated to the ages that are required for our exploration of the birth trough of 1919 (indicated by
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(3) Now, in order to derive the death rate in 1918 from the amplitude of the death
peak, we need an estimate for the death rate in normal times. Although in some
cases this death rate may be known, most often it is not. In the two cases considered
below the normal death rates are not known for the simple reason that there was no
registration network. In such a cas one takes the death rate in a region that is similar
in terms of socio-economic conditions. For instance one may take the death rate in
1915 in Sweden which is 14.7 0/00 (Flora et al. 1987, p.73). Here, as the death rate
in Pennsylvania is in fact well known (for in 1915 it was already a death registration
state) we can check whether the Swedish proxy is reasonable. It is indeed for in
Pennsylvania in 1915 the death rate was 13.2 0/00.
Thus, the predicted death rate in 1918 becomes: µ = 1.57× 14.7 = 23.1.
Compared with the real value of 18.1 0/00 there is a difference of 28%. This could
seem high, but one should remember that in such matters the estimates by various
authors often differ by 100% or more. In the first case considered below, no estimate
whatsoever was available and in the second case the official estimate may have been
highly exagerated.
Georgia during the American Civil War
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As an illustration of the kind of situation for which the birth-death method may be
useful consider the state of Georgia in 1864, the year of the Civil War during which
General Sherman led Union troops through Georgia on what is called the “March to
the Sea”(Nov.–Dec 1864) which resulted in great damages.
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
1854 1856 1858 1860 1862 1864 1866 1868 1870
Year of birth (x) of age group
Si
ze
 o
f a
ge
 gr
ou
p b
orn
 in
 ye
ar 
x (
18
70
=1
00
)
Civil War
Georgia
Virginia
Fig. 10 : Reduction in birth rates during the Civil War in Georgia and Virginia The horizontal axis shows
the year of birth as derived from the age at the census of 1870. The fact that in 1861 and 1870 the levels are
nearly the same shows that there was no permanent emigration or immigration between the year of birth and
the census year. Source: 1% sample of the census of 1870 from the database of IPUMS, USA.
At that time Georgia was not a registration state which means that no death data were
recorded. As a result, one has no idea of the civilian death toll of the “March to the
Sea”. However, there was a census in 1870 through which one can measure the birth
numbers in earlier years. The population pyramid shows that there was a birth trough
of amplitude 1.33 and of width 3 years (Fig. 10). Applying the relationship between
birth troughs and death peaks leads to a death peak amplitude Ad = (1/C)A
1/α
b . For
the sake of simplicity we take C = 1, α = 0.5 which will give a fairly conservative
death estimate: Ad = 1.33
2 = 1.77. For the average death rate in 1861–1870 time
we take the rate of Sweden namely 20 0/00 (Re´sume´ re´trospectif 1907, p. 368). Thus
the peak rate in 1864 was: 1.77 × 20 = 35 0/00. In 1860 the population of Georgia
was about 1 million; this leads to an excess-death toll of 15× 1000 = 15, 000. There
may be a additional excess-deaths in 1861–1863 but as we do not know the width
of the death peak (usually it is more narrow than the birth trough) we will not try to
estimate them.
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The figure of 15,000 excess-deaths should be seen as a tentative estimate because
it is not obvious that the death-birth relationship derived from food crises can also
be used for a war time situation. During wars, the fact that husbands and wives are
separated may inflate the birth troughs to an extent which may critically depend upon
how frequently servicemen can return home. If the birth troughs of Fig.8 are inflated
through the separation effect, the figure of 15,000 will be an over-estimate.
Measles epidemic in Fiji Islands in 1875
It is claimed that the measles epidemic of 1875 in Fiji claimed one third of the pop-
ulation which was assumed to have been 150,000 before the epidemic (McArthur
1967, p.8). Note that both the population and the death toll are merely estimates
made by western visitors9.
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Fig. 11 Was there a devastating measles epidemic in Fiji in 1875? The ages given on the left-hand side
correspond to the age-groups in 1921. One expects a birth trough in 1875. In the census of 1921 this trough
will be seen as a reduced size of the age-group that is 49 year old resulting in a reduced 49 year old age-
group. Based on a death-birth relationship with an exponent α = 0.5, one would expect a reduction of the
corresponding 5-year age group as indicated in green. Source: Fiji census of 1921, the first in which ages were
recorded, cited in McArthur (1967, p.38).
This sounds somewhat surprising when compared to the death toll of the influenza
epidemic of 1918 which was only 5%. This last figure is probably more reliable
than the one for 1875 because in the meanwhile the procedure for births and deaths
registration was improved by the British administration. Fig. 11 is based on the
census of 1921. This was not the first one but in the censuses of 1879,1881, 1891,
1901 and 1911 only 4 age groups were distinguished, namely: children, youths,
adults and aged.
9For instance, the population estimates published by different visitors range from 100,000 to 300,000.
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Even without doing any further calculation a comparison with Anhui (where the
death toll was 5%) shows that the 33% claim seems dubious. It is true that instead of
annual data here we have only 5-year averages but in Anhui the contraction would
still be clearly visible on 5-year averages. More specifically, a calculation involves
the following steps. (i) Computation of the amplitude of the death spike based on
the 33% death toll. (ii) Computation of the amplitude of the birth trough based on
the death-birth relationship; for α we selected α = 0.5 but taking another value (e.g.
α = 0.3) would not make a great difference. (iii) Finally, from the amplitude of the
birth trough one derives the expected contraction of the 5-year age group (shown in
green in Fig. 11).
One may wonder why British authorities were favorable to the thesis of a big drop
in the Fijian population10. One reason which comes to mind is that in 1879 started
a massive transfer of Indian indentured workers to Fiji which had the purpose of
providing the manpower needed on sugar cane plantations. By 1946 the Indian com-
munity had developed to the point of being larger than the native Fijian population.
Conclusion
Outline of the exploration of food crises
In his seminal paper Jacques Bertillon used weekly and monthly birth and death data
(Bertillon 1892). We wished to see to what extent his analysis can also be performed
using annual data for in many countries only annual vital statistics are publicly avail-
able. It was shown that the death-birth effect can be analyzed in a significant way
provided one considers events marked by large-scale mortality. The annual death
birth data were found to be compatible with the 9-month time lag revealed by weekly
and monthly data (see Fig. 3.5).
By observing regional death peaks and birth troughs we found a power law rela-
tionship between their respective amplitudes in confirmation of a similar connection
already observed in Richmond et al. (2018b).
Agenda for future explorations of mass mortality episodes
The spirit of a death registration network is to go bottom up. Starting from block
level one should move up to county, state and nation level. At each step the death
numbers should be aggregrated until one gets to a total number for the whole country.
Any death estimate made at the macro-level without being supported by appropriate
10In British accounts the gravity of this epidemic is heavily emphasized (see McArthur 1967, p.8). The following
excerpt is from a report by a commission in 1893. In 1875 “the people were estimated to number about 150,000, and it
is recorded, probably with fair exactitude, that 40,000 died from measles during the epidemic which overran the whole
archipelago in the space of 4 months. Whether the Fijians who survived have had their stamina permanently lowered can
only be a matter for conjecture.”
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data at micro-level should be considered as suspicious. Unfortunately in many cases
of interest the data that would permit a bottom up procedure are simply not available.
The methodology developed in the previous section allows us to use censuses made
decades after the mass mortality. For instance, in the case of the Fiji Islands we have
been using a census made 4 decades after the epidemic of 1875. We believe that this
procedure can bring new light in many dubious estimates.
Appendix A: Specific features of the crisis in China
It seems that in the course of the past two decades the factual description of the
food crisis of 1960-1961 has progressively been replaced by accounts based on ill-
founded stories. The Wikipedia articles entitled: “Great China famine” and “History
of agriculture in the People’s Republic of China” illustrate this tendency. The second
one contents claims not based on any reference or outright mistakes11. Science is not
only about building nice models, first and foremost it means starting from the right
facts. In order to come back to a more scientific description, it is important to collect
as many hard data as possible. By hard data we mean data that can be checked in
some way. This is for instance the case of grain trade data because such figures are
published by the two trade partners, first as exports, then as imports. It is the purpose
of the present appendix to present a number of useful data.
Parallel with the food crisis and meteorological situation of 1878
An article entitled “La famine en Chine” [Famine in China] was published in 1880
in a French scientific journal (Margolle´ 1880) which describes a meteorological sit-
uation very similar to the one in 1959–1960, namely a severe drought in north China
over 3 years together with floodings in south China. In this article, the two phenom-
ena are explained by the existence of a strong high altitude air circulation from west
to east which prevented the steady humid flow originating in the south from reaching
the north. Instead the accumulated humidity would eventually be released in central
and south China and provoke the floodings.
The severity of the famine was described as follows. “Between 1876 and 1878, a
lethal drought-famine struck the five northern provinces of Shanxi, Henan, Shan-
dong, Hebei, and Shaanxi. By the time the rains returned late in 1878, an estimated
9 to 13 million of the affected area’s total population of about 108 million people
had perished (Legge 1878, Edgerton-Tarpley 2008). The publication of 1878 by the
“Committee of the China Famine Relief Fund” shows that this famine triggered a
mobilization in western countries. Relief operations opened a road to the action of
western missionaries. The famine took place 14 years after western powers helped
11Such as the claim that China did not import grains before 1962 which, as will be seen below, is not correct.
23
the imperial government to defeat the Taiping rebellion.
Excess deaths
When the death rate of 1958 is taken as the baseline the peak of 1958–1961 gives
an excess death toll of 14 millions, an impressive figure12. As in Finland the crisis
was a two step process: the fast population growth made the country vulnerable to
adverse weather conditions; then in to successive years 1959 and 1960 the country
was hit by severe droughts. We will also try to assess the role of the “Great Leap”
policy.
Wheat imports
The situation was aggravated by the difficulties and delays in importing grains. The
USSR was unable to export grains to China13. A table of the SNIE (1961) reports that
there were no Soviet grain exports to China. Soviet-China relations already started
to sour in 1960. In July-August 1960 the USSR abruptly withdrew nearly all of the
2,500 Soviet industrial technicians present in China; moreover, a disruption in oil
delivery created a shortage of petroleum products in late 1960 (SNIE 1961, p. 4).
After 1950 the United States had put in place a drastic trade embargo which, through
the CHICOM committee, involved also US allies. In 1959 the US had a large surplus
of wheat. An article of 8 November 1959 in the New York Times is entitled “Wheat
surplus is a big headache”. It says that at the start of the crop year the surplus
stood at 1.27 billion bushels (on the basis of one bushel of wheat weighing 30kg
12If one takes as baseline the level of 1950 the excess death toll is about 7 millions which is of the order of magnitude
of the recurrent famines that occurred in the 1920s and 1930s.
13The following articles published in the “New York Times” provide some useful glimpses into the situation.
• 10 May 1959: Drought perils wheat crop in North China.
• 19 August 1959: China is believed to be coping successfully with one of the worst droughts in mainland China
in several decades.
• 27 August 1959: China announced that its 1958 production figures issued earlier this year, had been overstated.
It also reduced output goals set for 1959.
• 12 February 1960: Taiwan buys for $5.2 million (about 0.1 million tons) of US wheat.
• 5 July 1960: The Chinese government spurs efforts to rush irrigation equipment into drought-struck north east
provinces to save wheat crop.
• 7 August 1960: The Chinese government is resorting to extraordinary measures to produce food. Millions of
people are shifted from nonagricultural jobs to fight shortage.
• 16 October 1960: Several million tons of wild plants have been collected in north China against losses caused by
crop failure, the Peiping radio has reported.
• 23 January 1961: In 1960 China and the Soviet Union had an “unsatisfactory agricultural output”.
• 4 May 1961: An agreement was signed between China and Canada for the sale of 6 million tons of grains (at a
cost of $362 millions) over a period of 2.5 years.
• 13 September 1961: Canada is also exporting grains to the Soviet Union and Poland.
• 10March 1977: After three years of reducing its wheat imports, China is once again diping deeply into its foreign
currency reserves to feed its people. Total wheat imports reached $550 million. [At a price of $55/ton this represents 10
million tons, i.e. some 6.5% of Chinese consumption. Without such massive imports the situation might have become
quite as dramatic as in 1960.]
• 20 March 1977: China’s economic performance last year was the worst since the Cultural Revolution in the
late 1960’s, with the growth rates of industrial and agricultural production well below those of 1975. [According to
government data, the real GDP growth rate was 8.7% in 1975 and -1.6% in 1976.]
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this quantity represented 38 million tons) enough to meet US domestic needs for
two years. Nevertheless, US exports to China were practically nil between 1950 and
1970.
Led by its fairly independent Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, Canada was willing
to brave the embargo. It sold a small amount of wheat to China in 1958 and opened
discussions with the US to get permission to sell more. Indeed, in 1961 Canada sold
about 1 million tons of wheat and barley to China. This represented one third of total
Chinese imports of foodgrains in 1961 (Lu 1997, p.22) but less than 1% of the total
production of around 170 million tons according to SNIE (1961, p.3). It was both
too little and too late14. In summary, it can be said that through its own embargo and
its influence on other western grain exporting countries, the United States bears at
least partial responsibility in the crisis of 1960.
Conflicting accounts
Most present-day accounts blame the “Great Leap Forward” as the main cause of the
food crisis. However, a US intelligence report (SNIE 1961) which was published in
April 1961 gives another perspective. It is of interest for several reasons.
(1) Classified as “Secret”, this joint report of the intelligence organizations of the
Army, Navy, Air Force, State Department and of the Central Intelligence Agency,
was not destined to be published. Therefore, one cannot claim that it was part of a
public relations operation and does not reflect the opinions of its authors. As a matter
of fact, it was declassified only in December 1996.
(2) As it was published in April 1961 it is possible to check whether its predic-
tions were confirmed by subsequent events. This test supports indeed the perspective
which is presented.
(3) The SNIE report contrasts with present-day mainstream accounts in several
important ways. For instance, it describes in detail the measures already taken in
1960; they show that, contrary to the claim made in the Wikipedia articles mentioned
above, the leadership was well informed about the reality of the situation.
Was the “Great Leap Forward” an economic failure?
Nowadays it is a standard and almost self-evident belief that the “Great Leap For-
ward” (1957–1960) was a technical and economic failure15. It is indeed quite likely
that it put additional stress on country side people, but was it an economic failure?
14A discrepancy can be noted between Lu (1997, p.22) and SNIE (1961, p.6) regarding the total imports of grain in
1960: the first source gives 5.81 million tons whereas the second gives 2.81 million tons. The reason of this difference is
that the second number is based on contracts which had been concluded by April 1961 when this report was published.
This means that there were additional contracts and deliveries between April and December 1961, probably from Burma
and Malaysia.
15Though also held in China, this view is more based on ideological reasons developed during the Deng period than on
hard facts.
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Although only of marginal importance for the purpose of the present paper, from a
scientific perspective the question certainly deserves to be raised.
The following facts can be mentioned.
• A short Internet search shows that at least 5 large dams were built in those years.
Here is the list.
(i) 1957–1960, Sanmenxia Dam, Henan/Shanxi, 106m, 16.2 cubic-km
(ii) 1958–1962, Xinfengjiang Dam, Guangdong, 105 m, 13.9 cubic-km
(iii) 1958–1962, Zhexi Dam, Hunan Province, 104 m, 3.65 cubic-km
(iv) 1958–1981, Chengbihe Dam, Guangxi, 70 m, 1.12 cubic-km
In 1964, Rene´ Dumont, a French expert in agricultural economics wrote the follow-
ing (Dumont 1964, p. 393, our translation): “Between 1955 and 1964 I observed the
most extraordinary transformation of the agricultural landscape. When one flies over
China from Hanoi to Beijing one sees that the regions to the south of the Yangtze
are now covered with canals, levees and dikes”. Naturally, the other side of the coin
was that for this kind of work men were often employed far away from their villages
which disrupted family life and reduced conceptions. This may have amplified the
Bertillon birth effect. It is a fact that birth reductions were much more pronounced
south of the Yangtze than in northern provinces.
• The SNIE (1961) report gives growth estimates for industrial production and
GDP which are summarized in Table A1. The forecast for 1961 was made under
the assumption that Soviet technicians would not come back to China; otherwise it
would have been higher.
Table A1: Estimates for industrial production and GDP growth during the “Great Leap Forward”
1958 1959 1960 1961 Average
(forecast)
Industrial production 33% 16% 12% 20%
GDP 18% 12% 8% 13%
Notes: It is often said that the “Great Leap Forward” was a technical failure but the present estimates made by
the US intelligence community tell another story. It is true that such a rapid growth was not sustainable but
the spirit of doing things notably faster than elsewhere is still present in China nowadays. The construction
of the high speed rail track between Beijing and Shanghai was completed in 3-4 years, whereas in France the
construction of a similar line between Lille and Montpellier (almost the same distance) took about 15 years.
Source: SNIE (1961, p.2,5) [Special National Intelligence Estimate].
Quite understandably the report does not say how these figures were computed but
the fact that making such estimates was one of the main duties of US intelligence
agencies suggests that they had means to do that reliably. Here again, the fact that
the report was not destined to be made public is important because otherwise the
publication of estimates could be a way to influence the public opinion.
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Despite the slowdown of 1960-1961 the average rates remain impressive even for a
fast-growth economy like China. They justify the SNIE’s observation that “Peiping
recognized that it could not continue the breakneck industrialization tempo of 1958–
1959”.
According to government statistics released later on, there was a decline in the GDP
in 1962–1963. It is difficult to separate the after-effect of the food crisis from the
consequences of the departure of the Soviet technicians, the shutdown (or reduction)
of Soviet oil supply and other adverse conditions connected with the end of the Soviet
economic cooperation. The end of Soviet assistance was particularly critical in the
face of the continued western and Japanese trade embargo at least until 1971.
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